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Illegal markets, protection 
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Crime in Rio de Janeiro
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Patron of the samba school Mocidade Independente de Padre Miguel, the jogo do bicho 
banker Castor de Andrade (1926-1997), during the score-counting of the Rio de Janeiro 
Carnival.
IHAVE sought to stress the need to differentiate between conceptual criminalization, such as described in the Penal Codes and in social representation and real incrimination, as my research in the field has 
shown that activities institutionally typified as offences and crimes are often 
treated as somehow distinct from the activities of the clandestine markets. In 
similar fashion, there are clandestine markets that are treated as if they were 
“legal” while others are reserved the preferential weight of criminalization, i.e. 
the “illegal” markets.  
In this light, I aim to emphasize the variety of situations which might 
(or not) be the objects of preferential incrimination within the so-called 
informal markets. It is precisely because the preferential criminalization of part 
of the clandestine markets does occur, as does the preferential incrimination 
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of certain agents in these markets, but not others, that we can: 1) distinguish 
sociologically between activities that are treated in social practice as offences 
or crimes and those tolerated as merely clandestine or illegal markets; 2) 
distinguish between the treatments given to such tolerated and un-tolerated 
exchanges as: licit goods sold in the formal market; licit goods sold on the 
black market; regular licensed goods sold illicitly on the formal market; and 
illicit goods sold illegally on the informal markets. 
 The term “illegal market” is generally reserved for this last-mentioned 
category as opposed to the full spectrum of illegalities and offences, 
encompassing the clandestine, formal or illegal markets (the latter uniting 
clandestine trade with illicit merchandise).  For example, many people 
distinguish between the acts of bootlegging alcohol and trafficking drugs; 
the “black market” of non-criminalized, but rare or licensed merchandise 
is granted a different status to the smuggling of contraband without due 
excise; the pirate sale of CDs is viewed differently to the irregular adoption 
of babies; the corporate exploitation of prostitutes does not attract the same 
opprobrium as the “trafficking of women”; police corruption provokes a more 
virulent reaction than does money laundering by large corporations; industrial 
espionage and breach of patents attracts much less criminalizing interest than 
do high-street pick-pockets and banking forgers.  Of course, these examples 
far from exhaust the multiplicity and variety of possible combinations between 
infractions and forms of exchange, between crimes and markets. 
 Understanding how different sectors of society separate and distinguish 
– inside and outside of the criminal code - what can and cannot be tolerated 
in terms of exchange, but which we avoid exchanging nonetheless, from what 
cannot be tolerated as acceptable items of exchange, but which we continue 
to exchange anyway, has been one of the focuses of my recent studies on the 
issue in Brazil (Misse 1997, 1999, 2005, 2006). This interest derives from the 
realization that in Brazil today, or at least in some of the larger Brazilian cities, 
like Rio de Janeiro, these exchanges have become so frequent and so important 
in people’s lives that it is no longer tenable to approach them from an 
exclusively moral perspective, and that incorporates their legal criminalization. 
And when it comes to classifying them wholesale as “Organized Crime”, thus 
interconnecting various levels of moral reaction within the same group of 
phenomena, the problem becomes more complex still.
 Organized Crime and clandestine and illegal markets
 The notion of “Organized Crime” conceals more than it reveals of 
the small nuances and large differences in the diversity of players, networks 
and practices that fall under this same social accusation (and the respective 
processes of incrimination) of infringing, regularly and articulately, against 
articles of the Penal Code and Special Laws. Such is the diversity of crimes 
and their contexts and the number of social organizations capable of 
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committing them that sweeping them all under the same umbrella expression 
is bound to lead to considerable errors. After all, what does one hope to 
achieve? Set criminal organizations apart from conventional one-man crimes? 
Distinguish the social articulation of criminal groups from those faits divers
of the staple of the media chronicle? The metonymic use of the term “mafia” 
in reference to the same problems is so relentless that what the Penal Code 
typifies simply as “the formation of a gang” (but which subsumes a wide 
range of different activities) ends up being taken as “mafia-making”, one way 
or the other1.
 The notion becomes so widely employed that the contexts of its use 
serve to delimit the meaning of the term, which in turn obscures its inevitable 
polysemy in practice and in everyday life. However, we well know that any thief 
who systematically plies his trade needs handlers, that his contact with these 
implies a degree of articulation and that everyone involved is therefore actively 
participating in networks for the handling and sale of stolen goods. Should 
we say, therefore, that this thief is a member of an organized crime network? 
Is our crook involved in “Organized Crime”? Such is the decentralization 
in “underground” economies or “clandestine capitalism”2 that for the three 
or four “cartels” running the Colombian drug trade there are about a 
hundred medium-sized organizations and some three thousand “small firms” 
(Labrousse, 2004).
 The illegal activities of street vendors in Brazil, for example, can involve 
a variety of types of merchandise. Nevertheless, Brazilians tend to differentiate 
between the “pirate” goods or contraband hawked by the peddlers and the 
dealers of illicit drugs: the former are referred to as “camelôs”(basically, 
peddlers) and subject to much less severe public censure than that heaped 
upon the retailers of cocaine or marijuana, for example. These are branded 
“traficantes” (traffickers), the same term reserved for international narcotics 
wholesalers, despite the fact that what we are talking about here are generally 
teenagers peddling “stash” and “joints” to other teenagers and youths. 
Indeed, the label seems to apply far more readily to those operating out of 
shantytowns, ghettoes or other low-income zones in large Brazilian cities 
than it does to those working from little black telephone books and trust 
networks in the same middle and upper-class neighborhoods they come 
from themselves. In this case, the distinguishing factor appears to be not the 
merchandise sold, but the different levels of violence than can go with it.
Finally, there are those who reserve the designation “Organized 
Crime” for the kind of criminal organization that is capable of corrupting 
agents of the State, becoming practically invulnerable to the repressive action 
of the law in the process. However, it is difficult to tell when there is cooption 
and when there is just another illegal market that happens to trade in political 
merchandise (Misse, 2006) and, as such, would be no different from any other 
illegal market, except for the fact that the goods it “offers” are A-list derivatives 
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from relationships of power or simply harvested from public authority, like a 
privatized and commercialized fraction of the sovereignty of the State. 
 Jogo do Bicho (The Animal Game)
Before the Movimento (“movement” - term given to the trafficking 
and sale of illicit drugs in the shantytowns) became the main focus of public 
security in Rio de Janeiro, the “animal game” (jogo do bicho) was the city’s 
most important, traditional and powerful illicit market. Its ability to attract 
manpower from the criminal “underworld” had long been great, particularly 
as a source of employment and protection for ex-cons. It was also, for a time, 
a prime source of extra cash for poor children and teens, who were recruited 
as lookouts at sales points and as messenger boys between the bosses and 
their bookmen. The structure of this market remained segmented into rival 
territories until the late 70s, when the main “bankers” in Rio de Janeiro (and 
other states) sealed a pact that created the Animal Game cartel, whose power 
would now appear to be in decline due to the proliferation of legal lotteries. 
The current heirs to some of the bankers have all but abandoned the “Bicho” 
in order to dispute control over the distribution of slot machines in the city’s 
bars and bingo halls, of course, under the traditional cover of corrupt factions 
of the civil and military police. Its social network, capacity for domination and 
local political influence turned the “jogo do bicho”, or at least its bankers and 
their circle of agents, bought politicians and clients, into something similar to 
the North-American gambling mafia, albeit on a much smaller scale. 
For an idea of the main types of conflict that characterized the violence 
in Rio city in the 1950s and 60s, one need only look back on the local news 
coverage of a series of crimes committed over the period of a single month 
during a war between just two rival “bankers”. The conflict involved gangs of 
gunmen on either side, which the press dubbed “Crime Unions”, and the clans 
of the bankers in question, and became a “bloody succession of gunfights of 
alarming proportions” (O Dia newspaper, January 26, 1961). 
 The structure of the “jogo do bicho” revolved (and still does) around 
a myriad number of sales points which are little more than the “presence” 
of a bookman. The player stops by the bookman to register his bet. The 
points/bookmen are often found in shop-fronts or on street corners like the 
“camelô” peddlers, or operating semi-furtively where there is some attempt 
at a crackdown. In these cases, they pay teenagers some loose change to serve 
as “lookouts” and tip them off when the police arrive. The bookman earns a 
commission on the sales he books and on the prize winnings from his point, 
though some may be on a set wage. A manager looks after a sector of points 
and bookmen, who he may pay salaries in exchange for their commissions, 
though in some cases the manager himself is on a set wage from the banker. 
The manager’s payroll may include accountants, lawyers and a few gunmen to 
protect the points against invasion by a rival manager or banker.
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 The bookmen rarely resist arrest during “blitzes”. As an infraction, 
a minor offence, the worst case scenario if convicted is a few months in jail 
under the full protection of the “banker”.  The banker controls a “territory”, 
which is patrolled by “his” managers, gunmen and bookmen. He is the one 
who receives the bettings and pays out on the prize-winnings.  The banker 
can “pass” some of his bets to another banker of the same stature or to a 
richer and more powerful banker, who may be the “owner” of an entire area 
or municipality. Operating under the name “Paratodas” (‘For all’ – the name 
given to the Rio lottery after the agreement that established the present 
cartel), this network of bankers covered practically the entire country without 
any of the “owners” losing their autonomy. A study of its current nationwide 
organization is yet to be conducted.
The same local structure is replicated in various “territories” and the 
history of the “jogo do bicho” over the course of the 20th Century in Rio de 
Janeiro was largely a tale of greater or lesser degrees of tension between the 
different bankers (fragile alliances on one hand, open warfare on the other), at 
least until  a stable alliance among all the main bankers in the city was forged 
in the early 1980s under the uncontested leadership of Castor de Andrade, son 
of a banker from the 40s and 50s and heir to the bicho in the neighborhoods 
of Bangu and Padre Miguel.  This “jogo do bicho cartel” legalized itself by 
founding the League of Samba Schools, which has run the famous Rio de 
Janeiro Carnival ever since, with the main processions broadcast live on the 
nation’s TV networks3.
 The battle for control of the points and gaming zones in Rio de 
Janeiro from the 1940s to the late 70s was an important factor in the social 
representation of violence in the city, but it was the link that formed between 
this illicit market and police “protection” that was chiefly responsible for the 
growing representation of police corruption (and connivance in general) in the 
city prior to the shift of the center of attention to the “movement” in the early 
80s.  All of the bankers and some of the managers who made it rich with the 
jogo do bicho founded and continue to run legitimate businesses alongside 
their illegal core activity. Castor de Andrade, for example, among other 
undertakings, even managed to set up a fish processing plant in the south of 
Bahia in the 1970s. There is a five-star hotel in Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, which 
belongs to the family of one of the city’s best known bankers. The hotel was 
built so that it could be converted into a casino should gambling ever be 
legalized in Brazil. 
In general, what distinguishes a “formal” economic activity from an 
“informal” enterprise is its greater or lesser subordination to regulation by the 
state. One should not make the mistake of thinking these to be clearly separate 
realms of activity, constituting well-demarcated “sectors”.  Various forms of 
informal “laxity” go into the constitution of “formal” economic enterprises, 
while the illegal informality of other activities can hide behind legal “fronts” 
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or raise funds in legal companies. Multiple and complex social networks 
develop around these different acquisitive strategies, both legal and illegal, 
interrelating “worlds” which the moral imagination would prefer to believe are 
completely separate4.
 All of these social networks that interconnect legal and illegal, formal 
and informal markets, the exploitation of political merchandise (bribery, 
blackmail, extortion, protection rackets) and the illegal commerce of regulated 
or criminalized products/services (gambling, abortion, prostitution and drugs) 
do not necessarily take on spatial or community contours, nor constitute 
“sectors”, rather, before all else, they weave a complex pattern throughout the 
entire social, political and economic fabric. When a spatial/localized form does 
begin to emerge, when a “territorialization” becomes evident, the issue would 
seem to acquire a political dimension altogether different to that of more 
dispersive criminality, be it conventional or otherwise. If, on the one hand, 
this territorialization reinforces stereotypes and stigmatizes important social 
segments within the urban space, on the other, it effectively constructs new 
social networks, which emerge from the balance of power that delimits these 
territories. 
 This occurred with the jogo do bicho, but it was in the 1980s that it 
was to find its most violent expression with the advent of the first networks of 
drug dealers in the shantytowns and housing estates of Rio de Janeiro. The 
self-proclaimed “movement” sprang up around the old, traditional and very 
often small “bocas de fumo” (literally ‘smoke-mouths’ – slang for drug points) 
frequented by the wiseguys and bandits that populated the rap-sheets of Rio 
de Janeiro in the previous decades. Its emergence is clear proof that some 
degree of organization is required to keep control over the agents who operate 
these “territories”, as well as to establish a relationship of exchange with the 
police force encumbered with repressing them. 
 The Movimento (“Movement”)
Movimento was the name given to the local drugs market – initially 
of marijuana - in the shantytowns, housing estates, villages and other mainly 
low-income residential areas in the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro city. Whether 
as a synonym of boca de fumo, or, in an extrapolation from its original sense, 
as a reference to “sales movement”, the expression originated as jogo do 
bicho jargon. Today, the term movement is common slang among dealers and 
consumers of illicit drugs with various acceptations depending on the aspect 
of this market. “Pôr um movimento” (Put some movement) means to set up 
business in a given place, also referred to as “botar uma boca” (literally, open 
a mouth [spot/turf]). To say that the “movement has strengthened” can mean 
that the ‘spot’ is thriving, with a large clientele, or that the sales and cashflow 
have grown at one or various locations and that business “protection” is stable. 
“Where is the movement at?” is a way customers can ask steerers to direct 
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them to the nearest spot or dealer. The term is rarely used for smalltime or 
autonomous dealers, but generally to refer to the social group controlling a 
particular territory. To say “Put some movement in Rocinha”, for example, 
does not mean that the people who put the spot there control the entire 
Rocinha shantytown, but only that there is movement there, in particular 
places or with particular people known to the clientele, with their own sales 
points, for which the term boca de fumo is still used today. 
 The sale or possession of narcotics has never been a mere contravention 
in Brazil. It was criminalized under title VIII of the Penal Code of 1940: 
“crimes against public welfare”, specifically article 281 of chapter I: 
“crimes of common danger”.  The prescribed sentence was one to five years 
imprisonment, plus a fine. It was amended in 1968 (Decree –Law No.385) 
and again in 1971 (Law No.5,726), introducing summary jurisdiction for 
people caught in possession (the majority of such cases), more severe punitive 
measures across the board, with jail terms of up to six years and fines of 
up to one hundred times the minimum monthly wage, and even harsher 
punishments in the case of gang involvement. In 1976, new legislation was 
brought in that distinguished between users and dealers, with more rigid 
sentences reserved for the latter, though preserving ample ambiguity as to how 
user and dealer should be defined; a task left to the discretion of the police, 
with total autonomy. We can see, therefore, that increased repression of the 
movement dates back to the late 1960s, as shown in Graph 1, which compares 
data compiled from judicial and police records for the period 1957-1985.  
Curiously, what one observes is that the rates from the judiciary for 
1966 are only equaled in 1972 and 1978. The introduction of more severe 
penalties in 1968 finds some analogy in figures from 1962. The police 
numbers are also very similar to those from the judiciary for all the years it was 
possible to compare the two series. The period that saw a recognized hike in 
cocaine trafficking (1979-81) presents lower figures than 1966. Despite the 
fact that, prior to 1976, the law made no distinction between drug users and 
drug dealers, the data represents the entire slice of the drugs market that was 
criminalized during this period. Most interesting is the change in the upward 
trend after 1966, precisely the period in which the drugs market attained 
greater social visibility and, consequently, attracted more severe legislation, 
prescribing sterner sentences.
 The most plausible hypothesis is that the difference between 
crimination rates up to 1966 (which revealed a trend of steady growth) and 
those after 1966, which invert the trend or at least level off at a rate lower 
than the figures for 1966, can be explained, not by the deterrent effect of the 
legislation, but by the proliferation of illicit transactions initially between the 
police and drug users, and then between the police and drug dealers. As soon 
as the legislation took a harder line against drugs, the market for pay-offs and 
bribes became more attractive, hence the slump in incriminations. It does not 
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strike me as plausible that harder legislation could have deterred drug takers or 
dealers, for the simple reason that an even more rigorous change in legislation, 
passed in 1980, did nothing to curb the rise in arrests and convictions among 
the movement between 1982 and 1985, a period which also saw an increase 
in the number of police officers accused of extorting bribes from suspected 
narcotics dealers. 5
Source: Misse (1999)
Graph 1
Judiciary and police figures for drug-related offences (possession and sale) in Rio de 
Janeiro City  (1967 -1985). Rates per one hundred thousand inhabitants.
Source: Misse (1999)
Rates fell abruptly after 1987, and between 1989 and 1993 numbers for 
narcotics-related convictions were not included in the reports published by the 
Department of Public Security, apparently overshadowed by the preoccupation 
with the enormous rise in homicides and violent crime. However, from 1970 
on, there are official records that distinguish police figures for drug possession 
for private consumption from those for possession with intent to supply, which 
enables us to disentangle the data presented in Graph 1 for at least some of 
those years (Graph 2).
It is clear that there were fewer arrests for possession (consumption) 
of drugs in 1977 (or perhaps earlier) in comparison with later years, when 
there was higher relative incrimination, though with drug trafficking once 
again topping the list of arrests in the mid-90s. Another revealing indicator 
is the vertical growth in the “movement” and in the volume of narcotics 
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apprehended during the years under survey, as well as the considerable rise in 
the presence of cocaine in these seizures.   
Source: Rio de Janeiro Civil Police.
Graph 2
Number of arrests for possession and supply of narcotics in the city of Rio de Janeiro for 
some years during the period 1977-2001. Rates per one hundred thousand inhabitants.
 From robbery to trafficking: the formation of networks
(“comandos”)
What made the Rio middle class lock itself away in high-walled 
apartment buildings and complexes from the early 1970s was not initially 
fear of the rise in the drug lords in the poor urban areas of the city, but the 
hike in robberies, with or without forced entry, in banks, cars, residences and 
apartments, not to mention muggings in the streets, before the cocaine market 
took hold. Though the rise in conventional criminality certainly came to be 
associated with drug-trafficking from the 80s on, it has yet to be proved that 
the “fear of violence” that gripped Rio de Janeiro began with the movement. 
Most analysts agree that the “sense of insecurity” installed itself from the 
late 1970s, but a brief look through the newspapers of the day shows that the 
problem had already reared its head in the first half of that decade.   
There are no reasonably reliable police records for the period prior to 
1977, but it is interesting to note that, in the area of juvenile delinquency, for 
which trustworthy records have been kept since the early 1960s, there was 
an extraordinary shift in the pattern of infractions during the first half of the 
1970s. Theft, for decades the most dominant infraction, steadily lost ground 
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 21 (61), 2007148
to robbery and was eventually overtaken by it in the period 1995-99, the same 
quinquennium that saw both forms of larceny eclipsed by an explosion in 
figures for possession of drugs, indicating a changing trend among adolescent 
infractors, from theft to robbery and ultimately to drug dealing (Graph 3). 
 This five-year period also indicates the lowering of the average age 
of manpower involved in the drug trade as a result of the succession of 
arrests and deaths among the older generation. The same trend – increase 
of robbery against theft and systematic growth in drug involvement – seen 
among children and teens between 1960 and 2004 can also be verified in 
conventional adult crime during the same period (upsurge in burglaries, car 
theft and bank robbery). This change in the trend, in broad outlines, occurred 
in the first half of the 1970s whether or not we factor-in the expansion in the 
lucrative and as yet less risky cocaine market.   
Source: Juvenile Courts of Rio de Janeiro. Obs: the figures for robbery also include armed robbery.
Graph 3
Children and adolescents accused of theft, robbery and narcotics (possession and supply) 
in the city of Rio de Janeiro per five-yearly periods between 1960 and 2004.
 One highly plausible hypothesis is that there was a change in criminal 
investment, often among the same criminal agents, that ushered in a shift from 
bank robbery and burglary to drug-dealing over a ten-year period, followed 
by a subsequent resurgence in robbery, whether associated with the drug trade 
or not. From the economic point of view, the choice of which criminalized 
merchandise (stolen goods or drugs) to deal in probably accompanied 
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oscillations in the cost/benefit ratio brought about by relations with segments 
of the police forces involved in the policies adopted for combating these 
different areas of crime during this period.  
 A cost analysis, in this case, should not underestimate the economic 
effects of the moral dimension involved in a comparison between negotiating 
with “crooks”, “gamesters” or “drug lords”. The famous line by Lúcio Flavio 
Villar Lírio, boss of a gang of bank robbers dismantled in the early 70s, goes 
right to the crux of just how confused the roles had already become in virtue 
of the overlapping of markets trading in different types of illegal goods: 
“crooks are crooks, cops are cops”6.
 Up to the 1980s the illegal informal market in Rio de Janeiro was 
dominated by the jogo do bicho. The cocaine trade only began to make 
its presence felt in Rio from the late 70s, and this would only be truly 
consolidated during the period in which it came to be definitively controlled 
by the gangs widely referred to in the press as the “Comando Vermelho” (Red 
Command), which occurred roughly between 1984 and 1986. The period 
that followed, marked by the decline in the Command’s “external power” 
over many areas of the drugs trade and its segmentation into territories, with 
constant warfare between rival gangs of the “movement”, continues to today, 
but reached its zenith during the years 1987 – 1994. This was the most violent 
phase, sparked by growing distrust among gangs and leaders, power struggles 
within territories and between territories and a notable increase in violent 
police repression (particularly after 1994). The main result was the influx of 
children into the trade from that year on, resulting in an upturn in deaths 
within this age group.  
 Up-close study of a boca (drug spot) and its “movement” allows us to 
trace some rough outlines of the kinds of interaction (Zaluar, 1995; Souza, 
1996; Misse, 1997; Dowdney, 2003) that comprise these illegal clandestine 
market networks in the poverty-stricken urban neighborhoods of Rio de 
Janeiro.   The so-called “commands” of the drug trade in Rio are basically 
networks formed by tacit and precarious accords between “owners” of the 
various sales zones (some of which also serve as distributers for smaller zones), 
most of whom are serving jail terms in maximum security prisons (Bangu 
I,II,III). These owners send “orders” to their “managers” on the outside, 
though these have difficulties translating the organization within the prisons 
to the reality “on the other side”, where the so-called “olho grande” (green-
eyed monster) of ambitious rivals underscores the lack of organization capable 
of providing protection and security and of fending off raids by the various 
other players disputing local control. In the absence of this organization, the 
networks on the outside are fragile and vulnerable to police racketeering. 
However, they end up finding protection in the very “system” charged 
with repressing them, but which often prefers to force them into buying its 
“political merchandise”.7
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 The structuring of the “movement” into networks began with the 
“Comando Vermelho”, but has passed through various different stages, albeit 
while maintaining a similar local structure. The local structure is preserved 
even when the largest network – which comprises various areas under the same 
“owner” or coalitions between different owners - undergoes modifications. 
Contrary to the general notion in the 1980s, there has never been a single, 
overriding network, much less an uncontested single leader recognized in all 
areas and by every “owner”. There is intermittent contact among “owner” 
friends and constant contact between the owners and their managers in various 
areas, but there is also constant conflict. 
 The first “owners” of the movement have been controlling areas since 
the early 1970s, but the networks began to form among the inmates jailed 
under the “National Security Law” of 1970 and from prior associations 
between criminals or former drug-point bosses. The continuity between the 
last “wiseguys and bandits” of the 40s and 50s and the current “vagabundos” 
(term generally used nowadays to refer to someone involved in crime) can 
be traced back to neighborhood or family bonds, but also to the “fame” the 
former enjoyed among the young “wannabes” born in the 50s and 60s, who 
sought to emulate their “bravery”, “astuteness” or criminal lifestyle. It was, 
therefore, through the mediation of the experience of the bank robberies of 
the 1970s that the drug gangs acquired a better degree of organization and 
start-up capital for the nascent drugs trade. In his brilliant ethnographic novel 
Cidade de Deus (City of God [1996]), Paulo Lins recovers this dimension of 
continuity by showing how the bandits of “Cidade de Deus” in or around 
1977 looked up to the “renegades” made famous in the press during the 60s 
and early 70s, like Charrão, from the São Carlos neighborhood, and “Grande” 
from the Macedo Sobrinho shantytown, in Lagoa. 
 The movement proliferated through a capitalization network based 
on a species of “loan” guaranteed by “bonds of friendship” or family, but 
recoverable under the threat of the debtor’s summary execution. But it 
was the organization within the prisons in the late 70s that strengthened 
the network (they even referred to the process as the fortalecimento,
“strengthening”) and sought to oligopolize the market from 1983/84 on. 
The Command supplied anyone who wished to open a boca with everything 
they needed to set up the movement in a new area, including guns, contacts 
for the purchase of the drugs and cash.  In return, the new “owner” would 
pay a regular and sizable chunk of his earnings into the Command’s common 
“fund” and agree to respect the rules of mutual support, alliance against 
enemies, respect, support and “protection” for the locals and, especially, 
for the “friends”. Any attempt to defraud the network on any level was 
punishable by death. 
 At the top, the network has never been entirely vertical, but always 
centered around an informal “commission”, with one part controlling the 
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“movement” from inside the prisons and another running things from the 
outside. Growing distrust between the factions on the inside and the outside 
and the ambition of upstarts intent on expanding their zones are factors 
essential to understanding the breakdown of the first network (1984-1986) 
and the subsequent segmentation (from 1987 on), with the structuring of 
the arms dealing business and the arrival of the first lightweight automatic 
weapons (AK47s and AR15s). In general, many parallels – yet to be fully 
investigated – can be drawn between these networks and the one that ran the 
jogo do bicho from the 50s to the 70s, with their division into areas, hierarchy 
among managers and sellers, look-outs and gunmen, local power-base and 
political interest in terms of “protecting” the locals on their turf. 
 The oligopolization of the jogo do bicho by its “commission” in the 
80s drastically reduced the violence sparked by disputes for the control of 
sales points. The attempt to do the same in the drugs market, spearheaded by 
the Comando Vermelho in the first half of the 80s, did not enjoy the same 
success and the death or imprisonment of its main leaders, some of whom 
were relatively “politicized”, and the fragmentation of the network into 
new commands (the “Third Command” of the 1990s, the “neutrals” and 
“independents”, the Young Red Command and the Friends of Friends, etc.) 
left the way open for the continuation of the territorial warfare we still witness 
today . This process reached its height in 1994, when the homicide rate in 
Rio de Janeiro hit an all-time peak of roughly 70 murders per one hundred 
thousand inhabitants, leading to federal intervention in the state. The murder 
rate has fallen since then and leveled-off at roughly 45 murders per hundred 
thousand inhabitants, the majority of which is still related to disputes for 
control of the city’s illegal markets. 
 The decline of the “Commands” and the growth in “political
merchandise”
Incidents of drastic proportions, such as the burning of buses in various 
parts of the city on two separate occasions, enforced shutdowns of local 
commerce in some neighborhoods and attacks against state government and 
municipal installations in 2002 all point toward the beginning of a decline in 
the “Commands” of Rio de Janeiro. In fact, all of these events amounted to 
a backlash, more or less orchestrated from inside the prisons, against harsher 
repression, a slump in sales due to police raids, increased police extortion 
(“paying out means giving in”) and the deaths and imprisonment of some of 
the biggest names in the Rio drug trade. Furthermore, the media warnings 
about the dangers of venturing into the shantytowns in the wake of the 
murder of the journalist Tim Lopes, from the Globo Television Network, 
by drug dealers in Vila Cruzeiro, in the so-called Complexo do Alemão 
(German Complex), scared away much of the middle class clientele that had 
previously frequented the drug points. This all coincided with a fall in cocaine 
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Morning of May 3, 2007, 
Vila Cruzeiro, in the Penha 
neighborhood of suburban 
Rio de Janeiro. A team 
from the Special Operations 
Battalion of the Military 
Police, nicknamed BOPE,
files out of an armored 
car at the entrance to the 
shantytown and a gunfight 
ensues. The soldier Wilson 
Santana Lopes, 28, is shot as 
he crosses the street.
Under heavy fire, fellow 
soldier Luiz Cláudio
Carvalho, 33, manages to 
rescue his comrade, but is 
too late. “Our impetus rose 
enormously after his death, 
and we took Vila Cruzeiro 
in minutes. Killing a 
BOPE operative is not very 
good for business”: words of 
Commander Alberto Pinheiro 
Netto to Veja Rio magazine.
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consumption by the middle-class youth as expensive synthetic drugs like 
ecstasy became increasingly popular. 
 The drugs trade did not disappear, but the movement slackened in 
many areas, which would partially explain the upsurge in robberies, as a 
counter-migration from drugs back to street crime took hold.  Such was 
the waning in drug gang power that armed groups of police invaded their 
territories, expelled them from their turfs and installed themselves as the new 
“owners” of the region, charging protection money from the locals under 
threat of reprisals. But before all this, some drug gangs were already dabbling 
in alternative criminal activities, signaling an interest in using the power 
they had amassed to explore other avenues, such as clandestine cable TV, the 
control of fleets of vans, the charging of tolls and protection racketeering 
(protecting the locals of a given area against other criminals).  The gangs 
that had won their autonomy through the drugs trade, now sought ways of 
complementing it in order to be able to continue to exist without it some day. 
In the trail of the deaths and arrests of recent years, this was a sign of decline 
in the drugs trade. 
 The same occurred with the arms trade, largely run by ex-policemen. 
The sheer volume of weapons seizures in Rio de Janeiro in recent decades 
reached such extraordinary figures that it took its toll on the drugs trade 
through the high cost of replacing lost guns. Though attenuated somewhat by 
the “return” of some of the firearms confiscated from the drug dealers via the 
pipeline of “political merchandise”, there has been a relative stabilization of 
gangland warfare since the end of the 90s, a fact that was probably responsible 
for the fall in murder rates in subsequent years.
 The advent of the “militias” - the name popularized in the media 
from 2006 on - actually dates to much further back. Policemen living in 
the same small shantytowns or housing estates would come together to 
prevent the entry of drug gangs and to expel or kill thieves or other youths 
identified as being involved in crime. For example, the drug trade has never 
managed to install itself in the “Rio das Pedras” shantytown, despite its 
thousands of inhabitants. It has been known for many years that some 
policemen charge protection money from local residents and shop-owners. 
The practice has long been in place in small estates and complexes on the 
East Side and in part of Leopoldina, but it is not always local policemen 
who are running it. The phenomenon of the “militias” rose to prominence 
in 2006 with news of organized invasions of shantytowns and housing 
estates by groups of thirty to forty military policemen. Once they had 
expelled the drug gangs, these militias would then install cells of four 
to eight members who would start demanding “contributions” from the 
residents in order to maintain “order”. They would then go on to take over 
the other businesses previously run by the gangs, such as the clandestine 
cable TV hook-ups or the sale of bottled gas.
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 The “militia” strategy is clearly modeled on that employed by the drug 
gangs themselves:  bring together dealers from various areas and mount an 
invasion. Once successful, install a small but heavily armed group to control 
the “territory”, over which they exercise total dominion and can run lucrative, 
parallel businesses. However, this militia “protection” should not be confused 
with the “private vigilantes” hired by the residents of high-risk areas. In 
the case of the militias, there have been many accounts of violence against 
residents who have refused to “contribute” in return for police protection.
 The conflicts between drug gangs, militias and the police have caused 
many deaths, including of residents with absolutely nothing to do with any of 
the groups. The residents’ associations of the areas under dispute are usually 
the first to be hit, and some of their leaders who have resisted one group or 
another have suffered death threats without the police offering any guarantee 
whatsoever that they will be able to stay in or return to their homes. Factions 
within the police, who once battled the drug dealers, when not involved in 
the invasions themselves, now permit the presence of the militias in return 
for a commission. One cannot understand the forms of criminal organization 
in Rio de Janeiro without first understanding the role played by elements of 
the police force - among other agents of the state - in maintaining the status 
quo.  The overlapping of two illegal markets – one offering illicit goods and 
another which lives parasitically off the first through the provision of political 
merchandise – constitutes one of the main structural axes for the heightened 
scale of violence in Rio de Janeiro and its social accumulation. 
NOTES
1 The bibliography on the Italian mafias and their North-American counterparts is vast, 
from the now-classic studies by Hess, Blok and Arlacchi, up to the recent works of 
Catanzaro and Gambetta, and this is not the place to cite them, especially because, in 
the main, the issues treated here have little to do with criminal organizations of the 
mafia type. For an interesting article on this issue see Cesoni (1995). On the same 
matter in the USA, see Ianni & Reuss-Iani (1972) and Reuter (1983).
2 On the underground drugs trade see Shiray (1994); on “clandestine capitalism”, see 
Godefroy & Lascoumes (2004). On the same theme, see the collection organized by 
Kokoreff et al. (2007). 
3 The bibliography on the jogo do bicho is not as extensive as one would like. Among
the most important studies are: Machado da Silva & Figueiredo (1978); Pereira de 
Mello (1989); Chinelli & Machado da Silva (1993); Soares (1993); Herschmann & 
Lerner (1993); DaMatta & Soárez (1999); Misse (1999) and Magalhães (2005). 
4 On this theme see Lautier (1991); Mingione (1991) and Kopp (1997). 
5 The period 1983-1987 encompasses the first governorship of Lionel Brizola, generally 
accused of negligence in this department. Curiously, the data indicates a much higher 
level of incrimination in the area of narcotics during his tenure than in either of the 
two governments that succeeded him.  
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6 According to many journalists, this assertion by Lúcio Flavio was directed at detective 
Mariel Mariscot, who offered “protection” to the bicheiros (jogo do bicho gamesters) 
and extorted the bank robbers.  
7 By “political merchandise” I mean all goods whose exchange is fundamentally 
asymmetrical and almost always compulsory and whose value incorporates both 
financial and political costs. For more on the concept of “political merchandise”, see 
Misse (2005).
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ABSTRACT - By dealing with a variety of criminal situations that are qualified as 
“Organized Crime”, this article presents the evolution of the main networks of illegal 
markets in Rio de Janeiro - “jogo do bicho” (the animal game - an illegal gambling 
pastime in Brazil), the drug trade, and “political commodities” - , in order to argue 
that the sales and acquisition of these political commodities (such as extortions, 
corruption, sales of protection, access to information on police operations etc.) 
constitutes one of the key concepts in understanding the social accumulation of 
violence in the city.
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